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PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS UNDER THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT: DOES "JUSTICE" CARE?
INTRODUCTION

Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal...."I Section 2 of the Sherman Act, states that
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 2
A capitalistic society seeks to promote competition. Therefore, antitrust laws in a capitalistic society address the protection and survival of
competitors only to the extent that competition is threatened by conduct
affecting those competitors. 3 "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
consumer welfare prescription." '4 Consumer welfare is promoted by an
increase in the quantity of products if that increase is accompanied by an
increase in quality and a decrease in price. 5 Restraints on competition
are condemned by the antitrust laws if they restrict output. 6 Thus, one
objective of antitrust laws must be to promote economic efficiency.
To survive, manufacturers must implement distribution practices
which maximize their profits, not those of their distributors. A manufacturer cannot succeed if its distributors are earning monopoly profits because such profits will cause a decline in demand for the manufacturer's
product, reducing, if not eliminating, profits to the manufacturer.
Therefore, most manufacturers attempt to impose certain restrictions
on distributors in an effort to promote efficient product distribution.
This note examines the Supreme Court's approach to the legality of
vertical price and non-price restraints 7 by tracing case law development
of the "per se" and "rule-of-reason" standards of evaluation from the
1. 15 U.S.C. § I (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
3. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679. 691
(1978): Brown Shoe Co. v. United States. 370 U.S. 294. 3" (1962).
4. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, THtE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
5. R. BORK, I'i ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978).
6. Broadcast Music. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1,20 (1979).
7. Vertical restraints describe restrictions involving different market levels, i.e. manufacturer-supplier, distributer, and retailer. Horizontal restraints involve restrictions at
only one level. i.e. restrictions only with respect to distributor activity. Vertical price restraints usually involve agreements which set prices between suppliers, distributors, and
retailers. On the other hand, vertical non-price restraints involve agreements belween
diflerent marketing levels which establish such requirements as the employment of technicifly skilled sales personnel at the retail level. employment of a suflicient number of ser-
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early days to the present. The most recent Supreme Court case dealing
with vertical restraints, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,8 is given
particular attention. In addition, this note will critically analyze and contrast to the case law the recently issued United States Department of
Justice guidelines and enforcement policies pertaining to vertical
9
restraints.
I.

STANDARDS

OF EVALUATION

When vertical trade restraints are alleged to be in violation of the
Sherman Act, one of two judicial standards are applied. Under the ruleof-reason standard, in order to determine Sherman Act legality or illegality courts will take into account all factors which may impair competition.' 0 The factors most frequently considered by courts are the
positive or negative economic effects of the restraints, the market power
of the parties involved in the restraints, and the intent underlying the
restraints.'' In order to prevail, a plaintiff in a rule-of-reason case must
usually prove that the restraints result in an anticompetitive effect which
outweighs any procompetitive results. 12 In contrast, under the per se
rule, certain restraints are presumed to violate the Sherman Act on their
face without any proof of actual effect on competition.1 3 The practical
rationale for the per se rule seems to be to facilitate judicial expediency,
particularly given the underlying belief that "certain conduct almost always results in serious anticompetitive consequences."' 4 Because of the
very different burdens of proof required under each standard, the imvice personnel, and limited geographic sales areas, to name only a few. See 2 E. KINTNER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw §§ 10.3, 10.15, 10.39 (1980).
8. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
9. Guidelines for Vertical Restraints, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,473 (January
23, 1985).
10. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971). See also 2 E.
KINTNER, supra note 7, at § 9.20.
11. Carter- ll'allace, Inc., 449 F.2d at 1381. See also Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text; White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), infranotes 60-64 and accompanying text; Continental
[V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), infranotes 74-85 and accompanying
text.
12. Continental 1, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
13. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Northern
Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Restraints determined to be illegal per se include: horizontal
price fixing (price fixing among competitors at the same level of the market), United States
v. 'renton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1926); vertical price fixing (price fixing among a
manutfcturer and his distributors), United States v. Bausch & l.omb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707 (1944); tying arrangements (sale of one product conditioned upon the buyer's
purchase of another product when the defendant has enough economic power to appreciably restrain free trade). United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Times-Picavune
Publishing Co., v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co. v. United
States. 332 U.S. 392 (1947); group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal, Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114
F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940). aJTd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); horizontal division of markets (competitors at the same market level divide either territories or customers among themselves).
United States v. lopco Associates. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
14. Pitofsky, i Defensr ?/ Discowiters: The .\o-Foll, Cast br a Per Sc Rile, lgaiist IVertical
1r ix m'g. 71 Gho. l.J. 1487, 1489 (1983).
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portance of the initial procedural determination of which test to apply is
readily apparent. To some commentators, the standard applied seemed
to determine the outcome.' 5 Thus, as the two rules have developed, the
most significant changes in their evolution have centered around determining the types of restraints to which these tests will apply. This section will trace the history of this development, emphasizing the
interrelationships and tensions between the two rules.16
A.

Early Development of the Doctrines

Of the early cases, 17 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. is
is the most significant in terms of determining the types of restraints to
which the per se rule will be applied. Dr. Miles Medical Company was the
manufacturer of proprietary medicines prepared in accordance with secret formulas. Dr. Miles devised a system by which it sought to maintain
the prices it deemed appropriate for the sale of its products. 19 The system entailed the creation of a minimum price which was to be enforced
throughout the entire chain of sales: from Dr. Miles to the jobbers and
wholesale druggists, and then to the retail druggists who sold to the
consumer.2 0 The Court, finding that this practice infringed upon the
freedom of the retailer, held that a supplier who sells his medicine to a
wholesaler is not entitled to restrict its resale through interference with
the purchaser's pricing decisions. 2 ' Justice Hughes concluded that such
agreements between manufacturers and retailers to fix prices "are injurious to the public interest and void." 2 2 Though the extent of its applicability has been both expanded and contracted over the years, 2 3 Dr.
Miles remains the leading case supporting the application of the per se
rule of illegality to vertical price restraints.
Seven years later the Supreme Court qualified Dr. Miles in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States.2 4 Here, members of the Board of Trade's
Exchange adopted a rule whereby all transactions made between the afternoon close of the Exchange and its reopening the next morning were
to be made at the price of the last pre-closing sale. 2 5 Obviously, the rule
resulted in the fixing of prices. Nevertheless, Justice Brandeis, balanc15. Id. See alsoPosner, The .Vexi Step in the ,ntitruit
Treatment of Restricted Distribution. Pet
Se Legality, 48 U. Cot. L. REv. 6, 15 (1981).
16. For a more comprehensive discussion of this historical development, see Redlich,
The Bitget Cnilu",,d thpPor So Rule. 44 ALB. L. REV. I (1979).
17. For other early cases addressing the legality of price restraints, see United Staters
v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (assertion that price fixing was
reasonable not a defense to Sherman Act violations), mnodified. 175 U.S. 21 1 (1899); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (reasonableness not a defense
to illegality of unitbrm rate agreements).
18. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
19. /d. at 394.
20. Id.
21. Id. al 408.
22. Id.
23. See inl]i 0 notes 35-44. 65-71 and accompanying text.
24. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
25. Id. a! 237.
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ing the effect of the restraint against the underlying purpose of the Exchange to promote competitive trading, found the restraint to be less
important than the Exchange's purpose. 2 6 In Brandeis' view, the restraint was not designed to affect price. Brokers who had no vested interest in raising or lowering prices were involved, not producers or
consumers. Freezing prices in mid-afternoon may keep those prices
from rising or falling until the next day, but there was no reason to expect that anything worse would occur. Therefore, Brandeis found the
arrangement to be price neutral.2 7 More interesting than this conclusion is the language employed by Justice Brandeis in reaching his decision. He stated that the issue of anticompetitive effect of restraints must
be determined by considering "the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and after the restraint is imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable.''28 By this language, Justice Brandeis foreshadowed, as
well as provided the intellectual foundation for, the application of the
29
rule-of-reason standard by the Burger Court some sixty years later.
Nearly ten years later, Chicago Board of Trade's effect on price-fixing
cases was diminished by the result the Court reached in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co. 0 Convicted of price fixing, the defendants claimed
on appeal that-the trial court had erred when it failed to instruct the jury
as to the law in Chicago Board of Trade.3 1 The trial court instruction had
been "that an agreement on the part of the members of a combination
controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the prices which the
members are to charge for their commodity, is in itself an undue and
unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce .... 2 The Supreme
Court held this instruction to be correct. 3 3 Justice Stone was unimpressed by the Brandeis opinion in Chicago Board of Trade: "That decision, dealing as it did with a regulation of a board of trade, does not
sanction a price agreement among competitors in an open market, such
'3 4
as is presented here."
With the Trenton decision, it became clear that price fixing agreements would not be tolerated by the Court. Henceforth, price fixing
agreements were condemned as unreasonable restraints, violative of the
basic precepts contained in the Sherman Act, and illegal per se.
26. Id. at 240-41.

27. Id.
28. /d. at 238.
29. See inji. notes 74-85 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Cicago Board of Trade
is representative of distinctions between price and non-price vertical restraints first articulated bv the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (defendant's
aggregation of control over petroleum industry found to be an unreasonable combination
in restraint of trade).
30. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
31.

/i. at 395-96.

32. Id. at 396.
33. hi.
34.

Id. at 401.
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B.

The Colgate Exception

The apparent emergence of the per se doctrine as the primary
arbitor of Sherman Act violations must be qualified by a line of cases
from the same period which gave manufacturers a means to implement
certain vertical price restraints and still avoid per se illegality problems.
United States v. Colgate & Co. ,5 in 1919, dealt with a manufacturer who,
prior to dealing with wholesalers and retailers, announced resale prices
for its goods and later refused to supply any wholesalers or retailers who
did not comply with such prices. No express agreement as to prices was
ever entered into between the manufacturer and its wholesalers and retailers.3 6 The Court, citing Dr. Miles, noted that it was illegal for a manufacturer to enter into an agreement to set minimum resale prices, but
distinguished Dr. Miles by holding that it was appropriate for a manufacturer to choose to do business only with wholesalers and retailers who
voluntarily maintained prices suggested by the manufacturer. 3 7 Any unilateral action by the manufacturer at a later date would not be found to
violate the Sherman Act.3 8 Thus, by avoiding any express agreements,
manufacturers had at their disposal a means to implement vertical price
restraints without becoming susceptible to per se violations. 3 9
The importance of the Colgate exception to Dr. Miles was gradually
lessened by a line of cases 40 culminating in United States v. Parke, Davis &
4 1
Co.
In this case, not only had Parke, Davis suggested resale prices and
discontinued its dealings with retailers who did not abide by them, it
colluded with its wholesalers to enforce maintenance of its minimum
prices by retailers. In other words, if wholesalers refused to cut off retail
discounters, Parke, Davis would discontinue its dealings with the wholesaler. 4 2 This action, lacking express or implied agreement, was seen to
be a combination in restraint of trade which violated the Sherman Act
rather than mere independent action of the type held to be lawful in
Colgate.43 Even with this Parke, Davis collusion limitation, however, the
Colgate doctrine permitting suggested retail prices enforced by independent supplier action is still valid, qualifying the scope and applica35.
36.
37.
38.

250 U.S. 300 (1919).
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 306-07.
Id.

39. Similarly, in 1926, the Court held that if wholesalers or retailers operated in an
agency capacity the manufacturer could determine the resale price. The fact that the manufacturer acted as a principal, retaining title and risk, entitled it to set the resale price, In
effect, this decision enabled a manufacturer to enter into agency agreements on paper and
then proceed to set the price of their products. United States v. General Elec., 272 U.S.
476 (1926). In 1964, however, the court significantly narrowed this agency exception to
Dr Ailes by restricting it to patented products. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964).
40. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (exclusive dealing arrangement combined with extensive use of suggested retail prices found unlawfully):
ITC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (manufacturer's use of coercion to
maintain suggested retail prices restricts competition).
-I1. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
42.
43.

Id. at 35-36, 45.
/d. ait 45-46.

DENIER UNIVERSITY LAW REIIEW

[Vol. 63:1

bility of the Dr. Miles per se rule of illegality of vertical price
44
agreements.
C.

Further Development

The evolution of and interaction between the per se doctrine and the
rule of reason proceeded throughout the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's; the
issue continuing to be the type of restraints to which the respective doctrines would apply. 4 5 For example, in Albrecht v. Herald Co. ,46 the Court
dealt with the issue of maximum resale price restraints. In Albrecht, the
Herald Company had created a distribution system enabling its newspaper carriers (such as plaintiff Albrecht) to obtain what amounted to an
exclusive route. Because other carriers could not enter Albrecht's specified territory, Albrecht was able to set the price of his papers higher than
47
that suggested by the publisher and advertised in the paper itself.
Upon notice of this outrageous behavior, the Herald Company tried to
force Albrecht to lower his prices, and later tried to force him out of
business .48
The Court first noted that express agreements creating maximum
resale price restraints had been held to be illegal per se. 4 9 Here, however, although it was clear that in pressuring Albrecht to lower his prices
the Herald Company was attempting to maintain a retail price ceiling,
no express agreement existed. 50 Thus, it appeared that the Colgate
"suggested" retail price rule would not prohibit this activity. However,
the newspaper had hired another subscription solicitor and carrier to
take over Albrecht's area, leading the Court to find a Parke, Davis type of
combination which was illegal per se. 5 1 Thus, in spite of Colgate's inconsistencies, at this point in the case law development not only would an
express agreement to restrict prices require per se treatment, but evidence of a combination used to restrain prices, maximum or minimum,
52
without more would invoke the per se rule.
44. Along with Parke, Davis, actualities of the marketplace which make it difficult for
manufacturers to police prices without the help of other distributors or retailers may further limit the Colgate exception. Redlich, supra note 16, at 20.
45. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (exchange of price
information between competitors which affected prices is unlawful, but per se rule not expressly relied on); United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (GM's refusal to
deal with distributors who sold to discounting dealers is illegal per se); United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (manufacturer's refusal to sell to wholesalers who did not agree to set prices was illegal per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (per se rule applies to agreement among competitors
to fix maximum resale prices); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (per se rule applies to gasoline distributor combination aimed at raising prices by
purchasing price-cutting competitors).
46. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
47. Id. at 168 (Stewart,.,.dissenting).
48. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 148.
49. Id. at 152 (citing Kicletr-Stewart Co. %.Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. 340 U.S. 211
(1951)).
50. 390 U.S. at 147.
51. Id. at 148-50, 153.
52. Id. at 153.
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Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. ,53 was a case involving an alleged
agreement to boycott plaintiffs appliance store. It was Klor's contention that Broadway-Hale, its next door retail competitor, had obtained
agreements from the other defendants, who were manufacturers and
distributors, to stop dealing with Klor's. 54 Broadway-Hale did not deny
that agreements not to deal had been made. Instead, they claimed there
had been no injury to the public or to the competitive process since
Klor's could sell other products similar to those withheld by the
defendants.

55

The district court, using an economic analysis, held that the defendant's actions did not affect the competitive process. 5 6 Justice Black's
opinion for the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that
public injury should be measured by determining whether a given restraint impairs the freedom of individual traders, not by whether the restraint affects the general competitive process. 57 Because the freedom
of traders was affected by the agreements not to deal, the boycott was
deemed illegal per se. 58 To arrive at this conclusion Justice Black relied
on the Sherman Act itself and not on the economic analysis urged by
defendants. In his opinion, the fact that free trade was impinged upon
outweighed any economic detriment, or lack thereof, perceived by the
defendants. 5 9 Thus, upon the same facts, application of the rule of reason by the district court and the per se rule by the Supreme Court led to
opposite results. The Klor's case is significant because this comparison
between the two courts' approaches highlights the sometimes result-oriented nature of the two tests. For example, in cases like Klors, the initial
decision of which test should apply to the particular restraint is more
important in determining the outcome than is the actual application of
the test to the facts.
D.

Non-Price Vertical Restraints

In the 1963 case of White Motor Co. v. United States, 60 the Supreme
Court was presented for the first time with the issue of non-price vertical
restraints. The White Motor Company allocated exclusive territories to
its dealers, in effect eliminating intrabrand competition within these geographic areas and limiting interterritorial customer solicitation. 6 1 The
district court granted the United States' request for summary judgment
and invalidated the restrictions White Motor imposed on its dealers and
53.

349 U.S. 207 (1959).

54. Id. at 208-09.
55. Id. iat 209-10.

56. Id. at 210. Unchallenged affidavits "showed hundreds of other household appliance relailers, some within atfew blocks of Klor's. who sold many competing brands of
appliances. including those the dcendants reftised to sell to Klor's." Id.
57. Id. at 2 12-14.
58. /it.

59.

i.

60. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
61. Id. at 255.
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distributors. 6"2 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court was confronted by
a vertical restraint case which did not involve an agreement to fix prices.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, refused to apply the per se rule
and reversed the district court's summary judgment. 63 He made it clear
that the Court was not commenting on the merits of the case, only that
"the legality of the territorial and customer restrictions should be deter'6 4
mined only after trial."
Just four years after it had declined to apply a per se rule in White
Motor, the Court again faced the issue of vertical non-price restraints in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 6 5 Schwinn employed various methods to sell its bicycles, including sales and consignment arrangements
with franchise distributors and retailers. 66 Generally, the franchise
agreements prohibited franchise distributors from selling to nonfranchise distributors. Furthermore, franchisees could not sell wholesale to buyers outside a specific territory. To enforce these restrictions,
67
Schwinn allegedly threatened the distributors with termination.
Justice Fortas, distinguishing the consignment issues, held that
"where a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act resuits." ' 6 8 He went further and applied the per se doctrine to "restrictions

of outlets with which the distributors may deal and to sales to a retailer
which limited its freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the
products."' 69 Justice Fortas stated that "[s]uch restraints are so obvi'70
ously destructive of competition that their mere existence is enough."
This extension of Dr. Miles, applying per se illegality to vertical restraints
involving no pricing agreements whatsoever, was criticized by many as
illustrative of an overly broad application which ignored all the possible
7
pro-competitive aspects and effects of non-price vertical restraints. '
62. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
63. 372 U.S. at 264.
64. Id. In effect, however, the Court's reversal set the stage for the rule-of-reason
analysis to be applied to non-price vertical restraints:
Horizontal territorial limitations .... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial limitation may or may
not have that purpose or effect. We do not know enough of the economic and
business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may
be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for
breaking into or starting in business [citations omitted] and within the 'rule of
reason.' We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these
arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack . . . any redeeming virtue' [citations omitted] and
therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
372 U.S. at 263.
65. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
66. Id. at 367, 370.
67. Id. at 370-71.
68. id. at 379.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
7 I. Se gmeeraIly Baker, trical
,
Restian in Jimes of Chmange: Frtm While toSchwitn to
Schwim.
n
J1ethodt .Ie,"
r1975):
Pollock-,lAlerntive Distributio
I leNe?. 41. AN1TrITIST L5.1.537 (
63 Nw. lI.L. Rl':\'.
595 (1968); Posne'r-l,/i/rus/ PoticO) mid /hr Suprour Court." .M.-loolYsis q]'lhe
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Thus, when the Warren Court era came to a close, the per se rule was
firmly entrenched in all cases involving agreements to set price and also
in those situations where the freedom of trade was affected by specific
agreements. 72 Although a rule of reason analysis was utilized in several
non-price cases, 73 Schwinn represents the extent to which the per se analysis dominated the scene during the Warren Court years.
E.

The Burger Court

The most significant of the Burger Court's early antitrust cases is
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 74 In Sylvania the Court returned
to the pre-Schwinn distinctions between price restraints, to which the per
se rule clearly applied, 75 and non-price restraints, to which the rule of
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and PotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
282 (1975).
72. See supra note 13.
73. See supra note 29, and notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
74. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). However, two other cases should be mentioned. In Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Burger Court held price fixing illegal without using the per se rule. The plaintiffs in Goldfarb were purchasing a new house and
needed to obtain financing for their purchase. The bank requested a title search before it
would agree to finance the home. In Virginia, a title search could only be performed by a
licensed attorney. The plaintiffs contacted several attorneys; however, none would complete the necessary work for less than the amount listed in a minimum fee schedule published by the county bar association. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 775-77.
The State Bar argued that the fee schedule was not a means of fixing prices but rather
was merely a tool to be used to help gauge the appropriate fee for this kind of work.
Finding the argument unconvincing, the Supreme Court found that the arrangement created "a pricing system that consumers could not realistically escape." The Court believed
the attorneys complied with the fee schedule, in part, out of fear that disciplinary action
would be taken if they charged a different fee. Id. at 780-83.
In arriving at this decision, the Court employed the rule of reason. Nowhere in the
opinion is there a hint ofper se analysis. The clear impression garnered from the opinion is
that Burger did not wish to apply the strict per se analysis to a learned profession.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), involved an attempt to eliminate price competition. At issue was a formal Society policy
which barred competitive bidding on engineering projects. Members of the Society were
not allowed to accept work if they were asked to estimate the final cost; only after an
engineer had been selected for the project could a price be negotiated. The trial court did
not apply the rule of reason analysis to this situation in spite of the fact that Goldfarb
seemed to require it. Instead, the trial court found the arrangement illegal per se, and the
appellate court affirmed. 435 U.S. 679, 683 n.3.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff offered a public policy argument, which
asserted that the prohibition was reasonable since price competition between engineers
was contrary to the public interest. justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated: "To
evaluate (the Society's] argument, it is necessary to identify the contours of the rule of
reason and to discuss its application to the kind of justification asserted by petitioner."
Justice Stevens concluded that the arrangement was not price fixing but was clearly anticompetitive. Id. at 679, 687, 692. Although affirming the lower court's decision against
the Society, the Court did so upon rule-of-reason grounds rather than via application of
the per se rule, again not wanting to set a precedent for application of the per se rule to a
learned profession. For other examples of the Court's reluctance to apply the pei se rule,
see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (rule
of reason, not per se rule, applies to BMI's blanket copyright licensing system which utilized
fixed licensing fees as opposed to fees based on amount used by licensee): United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (effect on prices is not sufficient to allow%a
Sherman Act criminal conviction; there must be intent present to fix prices).
75. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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reason would be applied. 76 In an effort to increase its share of the market, Sylvania limited the number of retail franchises granted in a particular area, and required retailers to sell Sylvania products only from
franchise locations. 7 7 Continental TV was a Sylvania franchisee seeking
another franchise for a new store. Sylvania rejected Continental's request, but Continental ignored them and began filling its new store with
sylvania products. 78 Sylvania terminated Continental's franchises and
sued for recovery of money owed and secured merchandise held by
Continental. 79 At trial, Continental argued that the location restriction
was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act under the Schwinn
80
doctrine.
Addressing Continental's argument, the Court admitted that such
location clauses were among the restraints found illegal in Schwinn,8s

but stated that " [t]he question remains whether the per se rule stated in
Schwinn should be expanded to include non-sale transactions or abandoned in favor of a return to the rule of reason." 82 So framing its analysis, the Court overruled Schwinn and returned to applying the rule of
reason in cases involving non-price restraints, calling Schwinn "an abrupt
and largely unexplained departure from White Motor Co. v. United
States."83 The Court found that the location restraints did not have a
"pernicious effect on competition" nor did they "lack ... any redeeming
virtue.''84 Thus, by overruling Schwinn, Sylvania delineated more clearly
between the circumstances under which the two respective rules would
apply and, at the same time, marked the beginning of what some critics
viewed as the Burger Court's gradual movement away from extensive
use of the per se rule towards an expanded application of the rule of
85
reason.
F.

Summary: The Critics Line Up

Although the evolution outlined above was inconsistent and entailed several significant expansions and contractions, it is fair to say
that, after Sylvania, the Supreme Court would apply a rule-of-reason
analysis to non-price vertical restraints and a per se rule of illegality to
vertical price restraints.8 6 However, to the extent that this development
seemed to result in a clear procedure as to which rule applied in various
cases, it also evoked several criticisms which had been growing along
with the doctrines. One criticism was that procedural application of one
76. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

433 U.S. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 58 (quoting Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
85. Posner, The Ride of Reason and the Economic Appinach: Reflections on the Sylvania Derision, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 2 (1977).
86.

Redlich, supra note 16, at 54.
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doctrine or the other always tended to be outcome determinative.8 7 In
other words, plaintiffs won per se cases with regularity but found it very
difficult to win rule-of-reason cases, due mainly to the stringent burden
of proof.8 8

An entire school of critics decried the overly broad use of

the per se rule, arguing that many vertical price restraints declared illegal
per se actually had valuable pro-competitive effects.8 ' Some even asserted that the per se rule of illegality should be abandoned entirely, substituting a per se rule of legality. 90 Critics on the opposite side, however,
asserted that "vertical price fixing almost always generates anticompetitive horizontal effects at the dealer level.' '' Thus, theperse rule is beneficial in making the illegality of the activity clear and unambiguous,
inviting compliance with the Sherman Act, and preventing judges from
delving into complex and differing economic analyses. 92 Finally, the
Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the Colgate exception to the
per se rule had resulted in a major split in the lower federal courts."
This split was due in part to the difficult evidentiary question of the extent to which circumstantial evidence (of either collution or non-price
restraints affecting prices) could be used to invoke the per se rule. In
1984, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.94 brought most of these issues to the attention of the Supreme Court.
87. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1489; Posner, supro note 15, at 15. See also snpra notes
53-59 and accompanying text, discussing Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 349 U.S.
207 (1959).
88. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), exemplifies this inflexibilit'. In this case, a number of independent small and medium-sized grocery chains were
stockholders of Topco. In effect, Topco acted as their purchasing agent, enabling the
chains to pass on to the consumer savings generated by bulk-buying under the private
Topco label. Topco was formed for the purpose of enhancing its members' ability to compete locally with the large chains that sold their own private labels. However, Topco members were bound by territorial and customer restrictions. The district court found that the
pro-competitive effects of the Topco restraints "far outweighed" the anticompetitive aspects. See United States v. Topco, 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I1. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596
(1972). However, the Supreme Court found the restriction to be a division of markets
between competitors and hence, illegal per se. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
89. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
90. Posner, The .Vext Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Lealit,
48 U. CHI. L. REx'. 6 (1981).
91. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1491.
92. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 142 (1959).
93. Five circuit courts had held that proof of termination of a distributorship following complaints was not sufficient to find Sherman Act violations: Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853, 856-57 (1st Cir. 1982); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service
Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 93! (1984);
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp., 677 F.2d 946, 953-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1007
(1982); Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 ( 10th Cir. 1981); Edward J. Sweeney &
Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
[wo circuit courts had held that such circumstantial proof could lead to a finding of conspiracy to fix prices. Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1213-15 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 984 (1983); Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d
1226 (7th Cir. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
94. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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From 1957 to 1968, Spray-Rite, a large distributor of agricultural
chemicals, was an authorized wholesale dealer of products of the Monsanto Company, a manufacturer of herbicides. 9 5 In 1967, Monsanto instituted a policy of non-price vertical restraints centered around
renewals of distributorships on a year-by-year basis. Such renewal
would be based upon several non-price factors, including the extent to
which the distributor sought sales to retail dealers and employed sales
personnel with sufficient knowledge to inform purchasers of Monsanto's
products, and the degree to which the dealer would "exploit fully" the
market in its area. 9 6 In October of 1968 Monsanto refused to renew
Spray-Rite's distributorship based on this new policy. 9 7 However, fifteen months prior to this denial, Monsanto had received complaints
from competitor distributors who voiced concern about Spray-Rite's
price discounting activities.9 8 Spray-Rite sued Monsanto, alleging Sherman Act violations consisting of a conspiracy between Monsanto and
other distributors to fix resale prices of its chemicals, one consequence
of which was the termination of Spray-Rite's distributorship. 99 In defense, Monsanto claimed that a lack of trained sales personnel and poor
retail sales promotion were the reasons for termination.' 0 0 At trial, the
jury found that a conspiracy existed in violation of the Sherman Act and
awarded $3.5 million in damages, which was then trebled to $10.5 million.' 0 ' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that there was sufficient evidence to support ajury verdict of termination
due to a price fixing conspiracy.' 0 2 Thus, proof of complaints of other
distributors, followed by termination of the discounting dealer by the
supplier, was held to be enough evidence for a plaintiff to prevail under
10 3
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
B.

The Supreme Court's Narrow Holding

Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Seventh
1 4
Circuit's judgment, but rejected its evidentiary standard of proof.
The Court summarized the case law by outlining two basic distinctions.
First, it noted that independent actions by a manufacturer, as opposed
to collusions between manufacturers and distributors, were not forbidden under the Colgate doctrine. 10 5 Second, the Court distinguished be95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 756.
at 756-57.
at 758-59.
at 757.

Id.
Id. at 758.
684 F.2d 1226 (1982).
Id. at 1240.
465 U.S. at 759.
Id. at 760-61.
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tween "concerted action to set prices," to which the per se rule of Dr.
Miles would apply, and "concerted action on non-price restrictions,"
which, under Sylvania, would be subject to the rule of reason. 0° 1 citing
specific manufacturers' interests,'0 7 the Court emphasized that, in order
to prevent Sylvania and Colgate from being "seriously eroded," price fixing must be distinguished from suppliers' independent actions and nonprice restraints which are implemented through concerted action. According to Colgate and Sylvania, the rule of reason would apply to this
conduct. ' 0 8 The Court of Appeals' holding, stated justice Powell, failed
to take into account this threat of an overly broad application of the per
se rule.' 0 9 Thus, the Court set forth the new standard: "[S]omething
more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must be evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non-terminated distributors were acting independently." ' "10 In applying this
test to the facts, the Court concluded that enough direct evidence was
present for the jury to reasonably conclude that an agreement or conspiracy to fix prices existed.'it
More interesting than this narrow holding, however, are the issues
the Court declined to decide. For example, the Department of Justice's
amicus brief, in addition to asserting arguments similar to Monsanto's,
urged the Court to discard the per se rule entirely and instead apply the
rule of reason to all vertical restrictions, including resale price restraints. 1l2 The Department's argument embraced the economic effects
theory that price restraints should not be treated differently than nonprice restraints because both can have valuable pro-competitive effects.' 13 In a footnote, however, the Court refused to address the question because it was not argued in the lower courts.' 14
Similarly, the jury found that several of Monsanto's non-price restraints were part of an overall price-fixing strategy, resulting in the application of the per se rule rather than the rule of reason which typically
106. Id. at 761.
107. Manufacturers have legitimate reasons for being in constant communication with
distributors about pricing and marketing strategy, especially for purposes of eliminating
"free riders." Id. at 762-63. "Free riders" are dealers who provide no pre-sale services
and, as a result, undercut prices of competitors who provide such services, usually at the
behest of the manufacturer. Posner, supra note 85, at 6-7.
108. 465 U.S. at 762-63.
109. Id. at 763-64.
110. Id. at 764. "[Tihe antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 'had a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.* " Id. (quoting Edward .. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), ced.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
111. 465 U.S. at 765.
112. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-28.
Interestingly, Congress prevented the Justice Department from presenting this position in

oral argument before the Court by attaching a rider to the Department's appropriations
bill which prohibited the Department from spending any money on work to eliminate the
perse rule. Act of Nov. 28, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510,97 Stat. 1071, 1102.
113. Bricffor the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-28. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114. 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7.
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applies to non-price restraints. Monsanto's brief to the Supreme Court
had argued that "there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
findings" on this issue, essentially maintaining that showing an effect on
price by non-price restraints is not enough to justify application of the
per se rule. 115 The Court avoided this underlying issue in a footnote,
saying that because Monsanto failed to raise the argument in the Court
of Appeals, it was not properly before the Supreme Court. II
C.

Analysis

The Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto clarified the Court's position regarding vertical non-price restraints in several respects. First,
although Dr. Miles emerged relatively unscathed, the Monsanto evidentiary standard makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to prove collusion to
fix prices, thus making it harder to come under Dr. Miles' per se coverage. 1 7 This evidentiary standard tends to strengthen the Colgate unilateral action exception. Further, the stated reason for the standard-the
Court's belief that many vertical relationships are legitimate-may indicate a greater responsiveness by the Court to the pro-competitive aspects of vertical restraints and, as a result, a movement toward
increasing use of the rule of reason."" However, the two issues not
dealt with by the Court leave questions unanswered and future litigation
difficult to predict. For instance, it is unclear whether footnote seven is
an invitation to future attacks on the per se doctrine or merely a compromise on the part of the Court in order to hand down a unanimous opinion.' 19 Similarly, if Dr. Miles and Sylvania are to coexist, the question
that note seven of Monsanto avoided must be answered, namely, whether
a plaintiff can "end run" the rule of reason by showing that non-price
restraints detrimentally affect pricing. 120 It was into this post-Monsanto
setting, and perhaps with these issues in mind, that the Department of
Justice thrust its Guidelines for Vertical Restraints12 1 in 1985.
III.

A.

GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

Introduction

On January 23, 1985, the United States Department of Justice issued guidelines explaining its enforcement policy concerning vertical restraints. 122 The significance of these Guidelines stems mainly from the
115. Brief for Petitioner at 23-27.
116. 465 U.S. 752, 759 n.6.
117. For a thorough treatise on how future manufacturer/defendants can reduce the
risk of losing a case like Monsanto, see Klein, Some Thoughts on the Practicalities in Coiminicating lith Distributors After Spray-Rite, 40 Bus. Lw. 581 (1985) (avoiding circumstantial evidence of common scheme to fix prices by establishing direct evidence of vertical
interaction).

118. Id. at 584. See Distinctions in "1Ionsanto Provide Little Giiidance, Legal
1984. at 13, col. 1.
119. Id at 13, col. 2.
120. See sulra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
121.

5IRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

122. Id.

9150473

-inies,

April 9.

i.
(Jan. 23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Guielines
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insight they give on the stance the Department will assert in prosecuting
antitrust violations and in drafting amicus briefs. The Guidelines establish a market power criteria by which the Department intends to analyze
vertical restraints. "The Division will not challenge vertical practices
used by firms with less than 10 percent market share."' 123 This percentage test is based upon the Department's belief that a firm having less
than a ten percent share of a particular market cannot institute anticompetitive vertical restraints. 124 Through the Guidelines, the Department
expects to "eliminate almost all vertical restraints from further consideration."' 2 5 The purpose of the Guidelines was announced by former Attorney General William French Smith: "By stating its policy as simply
and clearly as possible, the Department hopes to contribute to the orderly development of vertical restraints law, and thereby help reduce the
uncertainty associated with enforcement of the antitrust laws in this
area."' 2 6 This section will first outline the scope of the Guidelines and
the two-tiered test that the Department will apply to vertical restraints.
This section will conclude with an analysis of problems which the Guidelines raise, in light of the common law.
B.

Scope

The Department clearly states that it has limited the scope of the
Guidelines to the issue of permissible and impermissible non-price restraints. ' 27 However, according to the Guidelines, "if a supplier adopts a
bona fide distribution program embodying both non-price and price restrictions, the Department will analyze the entire program under the
rule of reason if the non-price restraints are plausibly designed to create
efficiencies and if the price restraint is merely ancillary to the non-price
restraints."' 128 The Supreme Court, though, has yet to hold that price
restrictions can be analyzed under the rule of reason.1 29 Nevertheless,
the Guidelines continue, stating that "if a supplier adopts a bona fide distribution program embodying non-price restraints, these Guidelines will
apply unless there is direct or circumstantial evidence (other than effects
on price) establishing an explicit agreement as to the specific prices at
which goods or services would be resold."' 3 0 Here again the Department goes further than the Supreme Court went in Monsanto when it
refused to address the issue of whether non-price effects on price can
invoke the per se rule.' 3' Thus, although the Guidelines will apply
predominantly to non-price restraints, including territorial and cus123. Department of Justice Announcement, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,1 50473 (lan.
23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Announcement].
124. Id.
125. Id. at 56,187.
126. Id. at 56,186.
127,
128.
129.
130.
131.

Guidelines, supra note 121, at
Id.
See sipra notes 112-114 and
Guidelines, supra note 121, at
See supra notes 115-116 and

56,191.
accompanying text.
56,191.
accompanying text.
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tomer restraints and exclusive dealing arrangements, 1 2 they will also
extend application of the rule of reason to situations which the Supreme
Court has not yet authorized.
After outlining this coverage, the Department limits the scope of
the Guidelines by requiring that one of two "minimal market structure
conditions" be present before a vertical non-price restriction may be
challenged.'3 3 The first possible anticompetition condition occurs when
the vertical restraint is used to facilitate collusion among dealers and
suppliers. 13 4 In order to establish a likelihood of collusion, three market conditions must exist. First, it must be shown that the market in
which the restraint occurs was highly concentrated, pior to the imposition of the restraint. Otherwise, coordinating and policing a competitor's conduct will be too costly absent a specific agreement among the
competitors.' 35 Next, unless relatively few dealers account for the majority of sales within the secondary market, according to the Department
the price fixing or restriction of output will not survive the price or output "undercutting" by the non-colluding secondary market competitors. 1 36 Finally, entry into the primary market must be difficult, for
otherwise new competitors will quickly enter the market and undercut
37
the attempted collusion.1
The second possible anticompetition condition is that of excluding
rivals.' 3 8 The Department acknowledges that a vertical restraint may
exclude rivals if the following market conditions are met: (1) the nonforeclosed market is concentrated and leading firms in the market use
the restraint; (2) the firms subject to the restraint control a large share of
the foreclosed market; and (3) entry into the foreclosed market is difficult. 13'
The key requirement is that the firms employing the restraint
must be able to collect a large enough return from the practice to offset
the increase in their costs caused by the restraint.' 40 Thus, in analyzing
scope, two Guideline functions are significant. First, the Guidelines expand
the application of the rule of reason beyond the present common law
132. Guidelines, supra note 121, at 56,188.
133. Id. at 56,192-93.
134. Id. For instance, if all the suppliers of a particular product awarded exclusive territories to dealers, several collusive activities could result. Price fixing could be easier due
to the limited number of dealers who must agree to set prices or restrict output, and conpetition could be stifled by strict adherence to the geographic exclusivity. Further, "suppliers could police the cartel by replacing uncooperative dealers." Id.
135. Id. at 56,193. The market which instigates the restraints is termed the "primary
market" by the Department (for example, suppliers who initiate exclusive dealer territories). See supra note 134. The "secondary market" would be the dealers who, upon obtaining an exclusive market, could begin to fix prices or restrict output. By a concentrated
primary market, the Department is referring to the geographical area which the colluding
suppliers service. If the area is very large, implementing the restraints and monitoring a
dealer's cooperation by both suppliers and other dealers will be difficult due to the distance between the parties. Guidelines. supra note 121, at 56,193.
136. Guidelines, supra note 121, at 56,193.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 56,193-94.
Id.
Id.
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boundaries. At the same time, by requiring one of two market structure
conditions to be present in order for the Department to find a likelihood
of anticompetitive effects and thus proceed with examination of the restraints, the Guidelines severely limit the number of cases which will be
reviewed under the rule of reason. In effect, the Guidelines will apply to
more restraints. However, due to the actual tests and screens involved
in the Guideline's competitive analysis, out of this larger group of restraints fewer cases will ultimately be challenged. Part C will outline the
substantive factors which make up the Guideline's competitive analysis.
C.

Competitive Analysis: A Two- Tiered Test
1. Step One: Market Structure Screen

In order to more efficiently analyze vertical restraints, the Department developed two new methods of evaluation: the Vertical Restraint
Index (VRI) and the Coverage Ratio. The VRI is calculated by squaring
the market share of each firm involved in the restriction and then summing the resulting values. 141 The VRI numerically represents the distribution of market shares of the firms employing the restraint, along with
the extent to which the restraint is used in the relevant market. 142 The
Coverage Ratio is used to determine the percent of each market in43
volved in the restriction. '
Under the Guidelines, the Department intends to take a "quick look"
to screen out restrictions which it believes are unlikely to have anticompetitive effects. 144 This is accomplished by roughly defining the affected
market and then applying a simple "market structure screen"1 4 5 against
which firms using restraints are evaluated. According to the screen, if
firms using restraints have either small market shares, or use the restraints to a small degree, or use the restraints in markets too unconcentrated for the exercise of market power, they will not be subjected to
further scrutiny. 146 In order to apply the screen to specific situations,
141. For example:
[I]fonly two firms in a dealer market employ a restraint, one with a 5 percent and
one with a 20 percent market share, the dealer market VRI equals 5' + 202 = 25
+ 400 = 425. If four suppliers, each with a 25 percent market share employ a
restraint, the supplier market VRI equals 252 + 252 + 252 + 252 = 625 + 625 +

625 + 625 = 2,500.
The maximum possible value of the VRI is 10,000, achieved when there is only
one firm in a market and that firm employs a vertical restraint.
Id. at 56,195 n.25.
142. Id.
143. The coverage ratio is the percent of each market involved in a restraint. For
example, if 10 suppliers with 5 percent market shares each employ a restraint, the
coverage ratio equals 50 percent. The coverage ratio also would equal 50 percent
if two 25 percent suppliers (or one 50 percent supplier) used a restraint.
Id. at 56,195 n.26. Because the measurement of market shares on the basis of volume or
capacity would be "extremely dilficult," the Department will instead use the number of'
retail outlets owned or controlled by a firm "in the relevant geographical area as the basis
lor computing its market share." Id.
144. Id. at 56,194.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 56,194-95.
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the Department has come up with the following analysis:
The use of vertical restraints by a firm will not be challenged if:
(1) the firm employing the restraint has a share of the relevant
market of 10 percent or less [the small market share test];
or
(2) the VRI is under 1,200 and the coverage ratio is below 60
percent in the same (e.g. supplier or dealer) relevant market [the degree of restraint test]; or
(3) the VRI is under 1,200 in both relevant markets [another
measure of the degree of restraint]; or
(4) the coverage ratio is below 60 percent in both relevant
47
markets [the relatively unconcentrated market test].'
The Department will not challenge the use of the restriction at issue if
only one of the four tests is satisfied.14 8 However, if two or more of the
tests are met, the Department will deem the existing market conditions
to be at least susceptible to anticompetitive vertical restraints, thus re49
quiring closer Departmental scrutiny. 1
These tests in Step One were developed in an effort to enable firms
to determine if their actions, or contemplated actions, will be brought to
the attention of the Department. The Department's stated hoDe is to
"encourage the use of procompetitive restraints by making it as simple
as possible to decide whether a restraint will be subject to close Depart50
mental scrutiny."'
2.

Step Two: A Structured Rule of Reason Analysis

If a vertical restraint fails the Market Structure Screen of Step One,
Step Two applies a "structured rule-of-reason" analysis to determine
whether anticompetitive vertical restraints do in fact exist. The Step
Two analysis focuses exclusively on the observable effects on competition.151 The Department begins by carefully defining the markets and
examining entry conditions at both the supplier and dealer level. According to the Guidelines, entry must be difficult in at least one market
before the Department may find impermissible collusion or exclusion to
exist.1'5 2 Therefore, "if entry is easy in both markets, the Department
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 56,197. The Department describes the purpose of the tests in Step One as
follows:
Although those conditions are necessary, they are by no means sufficient; in
fact, their presence does not even imply that an anticompetitive effect is reasonably likely. Vertical restraints rarely have a significant anticompetitive effect....
In most cases, restraints not "screened out" in Step One will be found not to
have an anticompetitive effect through direct evidence of market performance or
other evidence indicating that the markets in which the restraint appear are functioning competitively.
Id.
150. Id. at 56,196-97.
151. "Having failed under Step One to exclude the possibility that a vertical restraint
might proniote collusion or the exclusion of rivals, the Department seeks to determine
whether the restraint on balance is anticompetitive.- Id. at 56,197.
152. Id.
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' 53
will conclude that the use of vertical restraints is lawful.'
Even if entry is difficult in one market, the Department will not find
a vertical restraint to have impermissible anticompetitive effects if: (1) it
is clear that exclusion is the only possible anticompetitive effect of the
restraint and entry is very easy in the foreclosed market, or (2) it is clear
that collusion is the only possible anticompetitive effect of the restraint
and entry is easy in the primary market. 154 In determining ease of entry,
the Department will look at the time it takes a firm to enter a particular
market and the size of the investment needed for production or distribu-

tion facilities. '

55

If, after the ease of entry analysis, it still appears that the restraint
may be anticompetitive, the Department will then look at several progressively more probing factors. The first three factors are merely more
refined applications of tests previously employed.1 5 6 Under the fourth
factor, however, the Department will attempt to determine the intent of
the parties in instituting the restraint.' 57 If the Department concludes
the intent is not anticompetitive, but is "merely an expression of excessive zeal on the part of low-level employees," or the action simply reflects "a purpose to prevail over competitors by lawful means," the
Department implies that intent to collude or exclude will not be
found.' 5 8 The Department will next look at the size of the firm employing the restraint. According to the Guidelines, "[i]f small firms use a restraint at their own initiative, the motivation is most likely to be the
pursuit of efficiency."' 15 9 Lastly, the Department will allow the firm using the restraint to demonstrate any pro-competitive efficiencies resulting from the restraint. 160 As the Guidelines put it, "[a]n ability to
demonstrate efficiencies that withstand scrutiny indicates that an anticompetitive explanation is less plausible than it would be in the ab6
sence of an efficiency justification." ' '
Thus, the Department's two step competitive analysis is essentially
an initial screen designed to isolate only those cases likely to adversely
impact competition, followed by a "structured rule-of-reason" approach
which actually consists of a series of more screens. Only after several
objective tests are applied will the Department move to more subjective
153. Id.
154. /d.
155. Id. at 56.197-98.
156. The factors arc: reapplications o" the VRI and Coverage Ratios in order to determine likelihood of anticompetitive effects: a second analysis of the extent to which conditions in the relevant markets are conducive to collusion: and a determination of a possible
exclusionary effect of the restraint. Id. at 56,198-99.
157. Id. at 56,199.
158. Id.
159. d.
160. Id.
161. Id. "For examl)le, an exclusive territorial arrangement justified on the ground
that it prevls dealers Itout ice riding is more likely to wiihstand scrtiny if suppliers cmi
)oint to prl!i
onal activities or other dcalcr-provided servictes ihat are hsitered 1. the
existcnce of exclusive territories." Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

tests such as intent or pro-competitive efficiencies, factors which are traditionally dealt with in judicial applications of the rule of reason.
D.

Analysis And Criticism

The Guidelines appear to be a meritorious attempt by the Justice Department to add strength and structure to the judicially created rule-ofreason analysis. However, the Guidelines have several serious drawbacks.
First, due to the sheer complexity of the tests involved, the Guidelines
may actually make it more, not less, difficult for companies to predict
whether their non-price restraints will be subject to Department scrutiny.' 62 For example, there exists a general feeling among experts in
the field that the Department's Vertical Restraints Index will not be effective because it is difficult to compute. Robert Pitofsky, former FTC
Commissioner and current Dean of the Georgetown University Law
Center, has described the Vertical Restraints Index as "awfully compli64
cated."' 163 Likewise, the attorney who represented GTE Sylvania'
before the Supreme Court, M. Laurence Popofsky, expressed "fear that
application of the VRI may prove too difficult in the absence of published industry data."!65
Second, perhaps in response to the Supreme Court's refusal to deal
with the Department's amicus brief in Monsanto,166 the net effect of the
Guidelines is to seriously limit application of the per se rule. While the
Guidelines specifically do not apply to resale price maintenance, 16 7 they
clearly attempt to limit the definition of price maintenance so as to eliminate per se analysis completely, in favor of using the rule of reason:
These Guidelines should eliminate the need to classify potentially anticompetitive vertical restraints as per se violations of
the antitrust laws because of a concern that it is so difficult,
time consuming, and costly to prove an antitrust violation
under the alternative-a cumbersome and unfocused rule of
reason. Thus, where there are doubts, characterization issues
involving vertical restraints should be resolved in favor of a determination that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule,
applies. ' 68
Obviously, this is a step beyond the current state of the law as it existed
after Monsanto. Monsanto and Sylvania both recognized the continuing
legitimacy of the Dr. Miles proposition that per se analysis will be used by
the Court to determine cases involving vertical price restraints.I li-) In
addition, the Department's statement that non-price effects on price will
162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
163. Vertical Restraints Guidelines Evoke Mixed Reartions l'ithin
Antitrust Bar, 48 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REI. (BNA) No. 1200, at 237 (Jan. 31, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Reactionsl.
164. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
165.

Reactions, supra note 163. at 237.

166. See sup/a note 114 and accompanying text.
167. See snpra note 127 and accompanying text.
168. Guidelines, supr note 12 1. at 56,189-90.
169. Mnhsanto, 465 U.S. at 761; Syvania, 433 U.S. at 58.
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be analyzed under the rule of reason rather than the per se test 170 goes
well beyond Monsanto's limited holding, taking a significant step into an
7
area where the Supreme Court has specifically refused to venture.' '
This extension has not gone unnoticed by Congress. Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, Representative Peter Rodino, voiced his
concern that "a unilateral announcement of a change in such fundamental interpretations of the Sherman Act reflects, at the very least, an insensitivity to the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in making
72
the law and overseeing its application."'
Finally, not only does the Department's two-tiered test modify existing rule-of-reason factors, it also permits the Department to justify
not challenging the significant majority of vertical restraints.17 3 In past
articulations of the rule-of-reason, courts have looked at the market
share of a company employing a vertical restraint; however this factor
was only one part of the entire rule-of-reason analysis used by the
courts. 174 Furthermore, the ten percent line drawn by the Department
is definitely arbitrary. 175 Thus, at every step of the Department's "structured rule-of-reason" analysis, the underlying presumptions seem to
lead to a finding of legality. Because of the tremendous factual burden
created by the Guidelines, it is unlikely the Government will challenge any
non-price restraints. Senator Howard Metzenbaum summarized this effect aptly, calling the Guidelines a "shocking refusal to enforce clearly es76
tablished Supreme Court antitrust decisions." 1
CONCLUSION

Under current case law the application of the per se rule to price
restraints and the rule-of-reason to non-price restraints seems to be outcome determinative. Both the current law and the Department's Guidelines, make it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to win a case in which the
rule-of-reason is applied. 177 On the other hand, at common law plaintiffs in vertical price restraint cases nearly always win because of the nature of the per se analysis. Critics of the per se analysis stress that vertical
price restraints are not always anticompetitive and argue for a more flexible rule-of-reason approach to displace per se enforcement. However,
the opposing view is that price agreements lead to higher, and usually
170. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
172. Reactions, supa note 163, at 237.
173. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
175. The Guidelines offer no explanation for the ten percent line drawn by the Department. The )epartment appears to have chosen the ten percent figure in an effort to enable themselves to challenge the fewest possible vertical restraints.
176. Reacrtios,. npa note 163. at 237.
177. lnterestingl,. former FTC Commissioner Pitofsky asserts that the I)epart ment

took Ihe position thai vertical price restraints are illegal only if unreasonable almost Ihree
years ago. and since then the Department has not challenged a single case of vertical price
fixing. I'itoisky, spra note 14. at 1495.
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uniform prices, eliminate price flexibility at the dealer level, and stabilize
higher prices at the manufacturer level.
Reaching a proper balance between the two rules is not simple.
Although the Department Guidelines are a response to valid criticisms of
the common law, if adopted by the courts, the Guidelines would so
strengthen the rule-of-reason that the per se rule would become impotent, causing plaintiffs to always lose their battle. It is clear the Department's Guidelines are not the answer, for they effectively ignore that
anticompetitive vertical restraints do exist, many of which are difficult to
prove. The answer to this quandry lies in the reconciliation of the principles set forth in Dr. Miles and Sylvania. The per se treatment given vertical price restraints in Dr. Miles must be weakened in direct proportion to
the amount the rule-of-reason is strengthened in its application to nonprice vertical restraints. Pitofsky's solution, "narrow, carefully defined
exceptions to a per se rule," although in need of specificity, seems to be
78
the most practical in terms of not sacrificing one rule for the other.'
He would allow minimum vertical price agreements in situations where
their competitive effect is clearly positive, but retain the per se rule for
instances where such effect is, or is highly likely to be, anticompetiive. 179 It Is this movement towards an integration of the two rules,
rather than total abandonment of one for the other, which will lead to a
more balanced determination of the legality of particular vertical
restraints.
Bradley A. Friedman

178. Pitofsky, supra notel4, at 1495.
179. Id.

